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Summary findings
Output collapses and crises are a fact of life. Severe  *  Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa also
economic downturns  occur periodically and have grave  maintained high Growth at Risk for both big recessions
consequences on the poor. Wang and Yao propose a new  and small recessions through  1980-98.  But for Latin
measurement for economic downside risk and severity:  America, Growth at Risk for big recessions declined in
Growth at Risk. Similar to the concept of Value at Risk  the 1990s.
in finance, Growth at Risk summarizes the expected  The authors  then investigate the relationship between
maximum economic downturn over a target horizon at a  downside risks and long-term average growth in a cross-
given confidence level.  country analysis. They find that higher perceived levels
After providing a taxonomy of growth risks, Wang and  of downside growth risk seem to be negatively associated
Yao construct a panel data set on Growth at Risk for 84  with long-term growth. When a country's perceived level
countries over the period 1980-98.  On average, different  of downside growth risk is relatively high, both domestic
regional groups experience very distinct Growth at Risk  and foreign investors might be deterred from making
patterns over time.  long term investments in the country and instead invest
* Non-OECD countries experience a higher downturn  elsewhere. The results suggest that prudent and
risk, while OECD countries'  downturn  risks for both big  consistent pursuit of socioeconomic and political stability
and small recessions are the lowest among all groups.  contributes to long-term growth, and that risk
* East Asia countries, which had been growing faster,  management in a broader sense should be a vital part of
had a high Growth at Risk for big downturns at around 6  the pro-growth and poverty reduction strategy.
percent, and it rose dramatically at the end of the 1990s.
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The 1990s has witnessed several episodes of output collapses and severe financial crises,
with grave consequences to the poor in the crisis-stricken countries. In fact, the past
decade  is  not  unique  in  the  economic history  of  the  world,  which  is  replete  with
recessions and depressions, from the bursting of the British South Sea Bubble and the
French Mississippi Bubble in 1720 (which at least one economic historian claims delayed
the  industrial  revolution  by  50  years)  to  the  depressions of  the  1  870s  and  Great
Depression of the 1930s; from the Latin American debt crisis, to the output collapse in
some transitional economies. Adding to those are the collapses related to external shocks
such as the AIDS epidemic, wars, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and internal conflicts.
Output collapses are very costly in terms of economic growth and welfare. Until recently
however, not many theoretical studies had focused on economic downturns, even though
volatility has been a major concern of policymakers and received much attention.' There
are possibly two main reasons for this. The first is that the widely used von Neumann-
Morgenstern  utility  function  only  concerns  real  current  consumption  and  future
consumption. In doing so, prior downturn experience is not incorporated in the utility
function.  The second reason is that economists have been using the business cycle theory
to understand output fluctuations. Lucas (1987), for example, suggested that the possible
returns from eliminating business cycles seemed to be trivial. However, recent studies
have found the potential welfare gains from crises avoidance to be large. Many have cast
doubts on the real business cycle theory.  For example, the real business cycle literature
focuses on shocks to the technology, but "the absence of candidate shocks is particularly
clear in  the context  of the Great Depression of the  1930s." (Evans, Honkapohja and
1 See section 2 for a literature review. Here our focus is on real sector downturns alone.  Studies on growth
volatility  are relevant but not exactly on the same track.
2 Recently,  Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) study asset prices in an economy where investors derive
direct utility not only from consumption but also from the value of their financial wealth, which are loss
averse over fluctuations. And the degree of loss aversion depends on their prior investment performance.
2Romer 1996, p.33).  Furthermore, a growing body of literature on new Open Economy
Macro (see Lane's (2001) survey) attempts to address open economy issues in a dynamic
general equilibrium with nominal rigidities and market imperfections. However, this new
research  direction primarily concentrates on currency and  banking crises  rather than
output collapses.
On the empirical side, few studies have examined the relationship between downside risk
of growth and the long-term growth rate, even though many have studied the lack of
growth or stagnation (Easterly et al 1993, Ben-David and Papell 1997, Rodrik 1998, for
example).  The volatility of economic growth and  its effect  on  growth have indeed
received much attention, see for example, Kormendi and Meguire  1985; Ramey and
Ramey  1995, Aizenman and Marion  1998, and Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz 1999.  The
standard deviation of growth rates is often used as the measurement of volatility in these
studies. By definition, it contains information of both booms and recessions.
Perhaps the most important obstacle for the study of downside growth risk is the lack of
an appropriate measurement for it.  In this paper, we offer an alternative perspective to
output fluctuation and  a measurement for  downside growth risk.  After  providing a
taxonomy of risks affecting growth, we employ the concept of Value at Risk (VaR) to
measure Growth at Risk (GaR), which focuses solely on the downside growth risk and
the severity of economic downturns.  In plain English, Growth at Risk (GaR) measures
the most serious growth decline from its mean with a specified probability over a given
time horizon. The benefit of growth at risk is that it measures risk in a way that most
people can understand it.
After constructing a panel data set of GaR for 84 countries in 1980-98, we investigate the
relationship between the downside risk and long-term output growth in the tradition of
cross-country analysis. We find that higher perceived levels of downside risk seem to be
negatively associated with long-term growth. An intuitive interpretation for this result is
the importance of  perception for  growth risk: When the perceived risk is  high, both
domestic and foreign investors might be deterred from making long term investment and
long term growth will suffer. 3
This  paper is  organized as  follows:  Section 2  reviews the literature  and  provides  a
taxonomy of growth risks. Section 3 introduces the concept of Value at Risk widely used
in finance and defines Growth at Risk. Section 4 presents a panel data set on Growth at
Risk  for  84  countries  during  the  period  1980-98. In  section  5  we  investigate  the
relationship between downside risk measured by GaR and long-term average growth in a
cross-country analysis. The last section concludes.
2.  A Taxonomy of Risks Affecting Growth
Business Cycle versus Growth Cycle?
Aizenman and Marion (1998) found a significant negative correlation between volatility measures and
private investment in developing countries, even when adding the standard control variables.
3The concept of a business cycle was originated by Juglar (1889), after a series episodes of
economic  fluctuations  or  crises  were  observed.  According  to  Juglar,  cycles  are
principally  a  feature  of  economies  with  highly  developed  commerce  and  industry,
division of labor, external trade, and the use of credit.  As such, economic downturns
were considered as necessary stages in recurrent business cycles. This idea was accepted
and developed further by many economists. However, a few economists have cast his or
her doubts by asking: "Do business cycles really exist?" as Hicks (1982) did.
In  respect  to  theoretical work, Evans,  Honkapohja and  Romer  (1996) use  "Growth
Cycles"  rather than business cycle to interpret economic fluctuation. They construct a
rational expectations model in which aggregate growth alternates between a low growth
and  a high  growth state. When  all agents expect  growth to  be  slow, the  returns on
investment would  be  low,  and  little investment takes place.  This  slows growth  and
confirms the prediction that the returns on investment will be low. But if agents expect
fast growth, investment is high, returns are high, and growth is rapid. This expectational
indeterminacy is induced by complementarity between different types of capital goods. In
their growth cycle there are stochastic shifts between high and low growth states and
agents  with  rational  expectation  take  full  account  of  these  transitions.  Under  the
dynamics implied by a correspondingly simple learning rule, there is a stable equilibrium
with "Growth Cycles". In other words, Evans, Honkapohja and Romer's  (1996) model
shows that growth rate is not determined as the existing business cycle theory predicts
and is also stochastic depending on agents' expectations. Empirically, Easterly, Islam and
Stiglitz  (1999) find  that the  fact that  that the  length of  expansion does  not  have a
statistically significant effect on the probability of a downturn may be suggestive that
there is no mechanical business cycle. This confirms work on the United States, where
Furman and Stiglitz (1999), have shown that there has been no regular business cycle (no
dependence of the probability of a downturn on the length of the expansion) since World
War II.
The US economy is a good example of growth stability relative to many countries in the
world. Yet it is not immune to output volatility and economic downturns. There is a large
literature exploring the question of  whether the magnitude and duration of economic
fluctuations have changed after WWII [examples include De Long and Summers (1986)
and Watson (1994)]. While the evidence on this issue is mixed, all studies admit the
existence of year-to-year or quarter-to-quarter fluctuations in the growth rate.  Figure 1
plots the growth rate of US per capita GDP over the period 1961 to 1998, which reveals
several economic downturns.
[Refer to Figure 1 at the end]
A Taxonomy of Risks Affecting  Growth
Following  the  footsteps  of  authors  cited  above, we  hereby  propose  an  alternative
perspective to understand economic fluctuations, which is growth at risk.  Economic
activities are inherently risky, which makes growth stochastic and unpredictable.  It is
4necessary to examine all the risks affecting growth and classify them.4 As the knowledge
on  growth risk  grows, a  clear  and  common taxonomy for  growth risk  may  appear.
Therefore,  we  adopt  a  generic  and  robust production  function  model  to  provide  a
taxonomy of risks affecting growth. We do not attempt to be exhaustive in defining all
risks  affecting  growth;  rather,  the  taxonomy  is  intended  to  be  illustrative  of  the
unpredictability of these problems that an economy may face.
Assume that all production activities conform to a general input-transformation-output
model involving the real production process, financial sector, institutional framework and
government policies. As such, an output downturn or growth risk is an aggregated risk of
many factors in  the production process  of the  economy. We  focus first  on the  real
production side of the economy, then move to the financial and institutional sides.  Of
course, the growth risk of an economy will also differ across countries according to the
nature of the shocks they face, the structure of the economy, and the policy regime of the
government.
*  Input Risks
According to the framework of aggregate production function, inputs, and hence input
risks, to an aggregate production process can be conveniently classified as follows:
- Labor force:  demographic changes, wars  and  epidemics such  as  HIV/AIDS
shocks may lead to large reduction in the quantity and quality (capability) of labor
force.
*  Human capital: Human  capital risk  may  come from  the lack  of  education,
training and experience. China's Culture Revolution during the period 1966-1976
when schools and universities were closed and intellectuals were persecuted, was
a  shock to  human capital, as shown in  our estimated human capital stock for
China (Wang and Yao, 2001).  Brain-drain is another risk associated with this.
*  Physical capital:  All physical capital including the equipment, buildings, roads
and other infrastructure, information and communication systems are liable to
break down. The "breakdown" may only be partial or a total and sudden cessation
of output production. Some breakdowns can bring a large part of the operation to
a halt. Other failures might only have a significant impact if they occur at the
same time as other failures. The sources include wars, hurricanes, earthquakes,
volcanoes, fires, droughts, and floods.
*  Production process risks: This may include a breakdown in the chain of production
process, or in the division of labor across regions/countries.  An example is that the
breakdown  of trade  links  amongst the  East  European and  Former  Soviet Union
countries led to a failure of original production chains in the early 1990s.
*  Productivity or technology shocks: Technological progresses have led to structural
adjustments and transformation: positive for some but negative for others. Examples
are plentiful: sunset industries in Japan; the defense industry in the U.S. after the end
of cold war; and "the new economy", the IT bubble and the subsequent burst.
4Much  like  a banker  faces  a collection  of risks  including  credit  risk,  interest  risk  and etc,  policymakers
may understand economic fluctuation as  a  collection of  growth risks,  rather than resorting to business
cycles.
5*  Financial risks: Giving its functions of channeling savings and allocating resources,
financial systems are vital parts of the production and economic process.  Due to their
inherent nature such as information asymmetry and market imperfection, financial
systems have many risks which may lead to systemic crises and breakdowns. Many
studies have  stressed the  linkage  between  financial risks  and  growth  volatility,
including Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (1999). They found that wage rigidities, at the
center of traditional Keynesian analysis, seem to have played little role in explaining
output  variability.  By  contrast,  financial  variables  consistently  turn  out  to  be
significant both in explaining variability and the likelihood of a downturn.  Their
results underscore the importance of financial variables in the analysis of volatility.
*  Macroeconomic policy risks: this may include those caused by imprudent fiscal and
monetary policies  and mismanagement of the economy, which put growth at risk.
Ramey and Ramey  1995, Rodrik  1998 and Romer  1999 discussed policy-induced
booms and recessions in developing as well as industrial countries.
*  Institutional  and  political  risks:  Broadly,  this  may  include  institutional
arrangements in  a  country, such  as incentive mechanisms, corporate  governance,
national governance, and the rule of law, level of corruption, and changes in political
systems that could put growth at risk.
*  Global and  external  risks: Changes  or  shocks in  global economic  and natural
environment which are beyond the controls of any one national government, or of
human being.
Impact of Downside Risks on Growth
The business-cycle theory and growth theory had long been treated as unrelated areas of
macroeconomics until recently.  The real  business  cycle  literature  (for  example,  see
Cooley  and  Prescott,  1995) views  long-term  growth  as  exogenous.  Similarly,  the
traditional growth literature has an implicit assumption: that the growth volatility does
not affect long-term economic growth.
Recently, there is an emerging research trend addressing the effect of business cycle on
growth. Theoretically, the  recent  studies  show  that  the  relationship between output
volatility and mean growth can be either positive or negative. For example, Matsuyama
(1996 and  1999) develops a neo-Schumpetarian model where  the economy  achieves
sustainable growth through cycles,  perpetually  moving back  and  forth  between two
phases. In contrast to this model which argues that business cycles are good for growth,
Vivek  and  Rowe  (1998)  develop  a  'neo-Keynesian' model,  where  monopolistically
competitive firms  set  prices  and  produce  output  in  advance  of  the  realization  of
(stochastic) monetary velocity. In such a setting, there is an asymmetry in the effect of
business cycles on  income: A more severe business cycle  thus reduces the expected
income of a firm and the expected return to  investment, which reduces the long-term
growth rate of the economy.
6The empirical research on the relationship between growth risk and long-term growth rate
has  been  relatively  rare  so  far.  Using  a  sample  of  47  countries  from  1950-1977,
Kormendi and Meguire (1985) regress growth rates on a group of explanatory variables,
and find that the standard deviation has a significant positive effect on growth. Ramey
and Ramey (1995) find,  in  a sample of 92 countries  as well as a  sample of OECD
countries, that countries with higher volatility have lower growth. And they conclude,
"By assuming no interaction between volatility and growth, the theoretical business cycle
and growth literature omit important elements. (p.1 148)"
Rodrik (1998) asks a question "where did all the growth go" and argues for a vicious
circle of recession and domestic social conflicts. A recession leads to a "shrinking pie"
and triggers  social conflict  within a country's  different  groups. The resulting  social
conflict in turn leads to the lack of persistence in growth rates. His empirical evidence
provides support for this hypothesis:  Countries that experienced the sharpest drops in
growth after  1975 were  those  with  divided  societies  (as  measured by  indicators of
inequality,  ethnic  fragmentation,  and  etc)  and  with  weak  institutions  of  conflict
management (proxied by indicators of the quality of governmental institutions, rule of
law, democratic rights, and social safety nets).
A big recession may lead to a long-term stagnation of an economy. A real example is the
Japanese economy, which has experienced its worst postwar stagnation in the last ten
years, with growth rates between zero to one percent.  For developing countries, a single
crisis (growth two standard deviations below mean growth) would cost the equivalent of
eight years of accumulated growth. Chile, for example, had on average zero growth in
GDP per worker from 1963 to 1988, largely because of two recessions: GDP per worker
fell 16% between 1973 and 1975, and 19% between 1981 and 1983. In addition, it may
take years or decades for a developing country to recover from an output collapse, as was
evident for Latin American countries in the 1980s, and for some tranisitional  economies in
Central Asia.
Impact of Downside Growth Risks on Welfare
Since the  Great Depression  in  the  1930s, government  policies have  been  aimed  at
reducing business cycle fluctuations, yet some economists were uncertain whether the
gains from such a reduction are worth the effort. In his celebrated 1987 book Models of
Business Cycles, Lucas presents some simple calculations  to argue that the trade-off
between  economic  fluctuation  and  growth  is  such  that  a  representative  agent's
willingness to pay-in  terms of growth rates for a more stable environment is almost
zero.
However, subsequent work has challenged Lucas' conclusion and found the welfare gains
from  maintaining stability to  be  large. For example, Storesletten, Telmer and  Yaron
(2000) note  that  there  are important distributional  effects  associated with  aggregate
variation which is why individuals care about business cycles. Based on both aggregate
data and microeconomic data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics, they find that
the welfare benefits of eliminating aggregate variation to be large.  Moreover, growth
downturns have grave consequences and long term adverse effects on the poor, as the
7poor lack assets to smooth their consumption. Due to the lack of education, poor workers
are less mobile than middle-income people across sectors and regions (see, for example,
Lustig  1999, and World Bank  2000). The social costs  associated with  the crises  in
emerging market economies have been substantial: real wage fell, unemployment rose,
and there is a sharp increase in the number of poor. School dropout rates rose among poor
children with grave long term effects on the human capital of the poor  (World bank,
2000).
Finally, Chatterjee  and Corbae (2000) seek to measure the potential benefit of reducing
the likelihood of economic crises. Based on the observed frequency of Depression-like
events, they estimate this likelihood to be approximately one in every 83 years for the
U.S. The welfare gain of reducing even this small probability of crisis to zero can range
between 1.05 percent and 6.59 percent of annual consumption in perpetuity. These large
gains occur because although the probability of entering a Depression-like state is small,
once the state is entered it is highly persistent. Athanasoulis and Wincoop 2000 also find
large  benefits  from  cross-country  risk-sharing:  The  gains  for  a  35-year  horizon,
corresponding to a welfare equivalent permanent increase in consumption, is 6.6% when
based on a set of 49 countries, and 1.5% when based on 21 OECD countries.
3. Value at Risk for Growth
Two Observations  on  Growth  Rates
Economic  growth  has  two  important  characteristics. First,  growth  rates  have  small
autocorrelations  and  are  remarkably unstable over  time. "Booms" and  "crashes"
characterized  the growth  experiences  of most countries.'In  addition,  Easterly  et al (1993)
find that the correlation  of per capita growth in  1977-1992  with per capita growth in
1960-1976  across 135  countries  is only 0.08. This low  persistence  of growth  is not just a
characteristic  of the postwar era. For the countries  that have the data from Maddision
(1995),  there is a correlation  of only 0.097 across  1820-1870  and 1870-1929.  In terms of
log per capita GDP levels,  Pritchett  (1998) shows  several  patterns of economic  growth:
Hills, Plateaus,  Mountains,  and Plains.  In particular,  GDP per capita in the United  States
is characterized  by a stable exponential  trend growth with modest cyclical deviations.
The average  annual  growth  rate of per capita  GDP in the United  States  is 1.75  percent  per
year during the period 1870-1990  (Barro and Sala-i-Martin,  1995). For the developing
countries,  however,  growth  rates exhibit distinct patterns and highly volatile.  Moreover,
volatility  of growth rate is enormously  larger in developing  than developed  countries.
Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (1999) find that countries  experience declining  real GDP
roughly  20 percent  of the time. Non-OECD  countries  experience  a downturn  22 percent
of the time,  while  OECD  countries  are in a downturn  just above  9 percent  of the time.
Second,  the observed  annual  growth  rate distribution  is markedly  non-normal.  There is an
asymmetry  of the growth cycles and it shows that growth varies systematically  within
upturns  and downturns.  It is typically  skewed  towards large economic  downturn  and has
a long tail at the left hand, as shown by the figures below. This  means that extreme
output  changes  occur  more frequently  than implied  by a normal  distribution.
8[Refer to Figure 2, 3, 4,]
Due to this reason, we start looking for alternative modeling methods 5. The distribution
of  growth  rate  can  be  estimated  over  a  number of  previous  periods,  assuming  all
observations are independently distributed. 6 Normal distribution is a typical example of
unconditional distribution. If it is assumed that growth rates are generated according to
the normal distribution, the entire distribution of retums can be characterized by two
parameters:  its  mean  and  standard  deviation.  Other  examples  of  unconditional
distribution  models  include  the  t-distribution, mixed-diffusion-jump  model  and  the
compound normal model. The purpose here is simply to check if the distribution can bear
any resemblance of a normal distribution. A flat distribution indicates greater risk; and a
tighter distribution implies lower growth risk.
Several popular tests such as Kiefer and Salmon (1983) for normality focus on measuring
skewness and kurtosis. However, it is likely that they have the low power problem due to
the small sample of annual growth data. Nonetheless, the values of skewness and kurtosis
for 84 countries from 1961 to  1998 from the World Bank database significantly differ
from 0 and 3, respectively. 7
As an alternative,  we examine  the distribution  of growth  rates of several  economies  from,
1961-1998 by using frequency histograms. Figure 2 shows that the US  economy has
experienced several recessions during the period 1961-1998. The largest drop of growth
rate is more than 3 percent. Figure 3 shows that Hong Kong SAR had a big decline of
,growth  rate while its growth is relatively stable and respectable.  The big recession of
Hong Kong happened in 1.998  with the .East Asian financial crisis. Figure 4 reveals that
Brazil had a "growth miracle" associated with 8 percent growth rate and "growth crash"
associated with -6  percent growth. It is obvious that Brazil's economy has been subject
to more dramatic growth volatility than US and Hong Kong.  These figures show the
non-normality quite clearly.
Value at Risk in Finance
"The Daily  Earning  at Risk for  our  combined  trading  activities
averaged  approximately  $15 million .......
J. P. Morgan  1994 Annual  Report
In recent years the Value at Risk (VaR) concept for measuring downside risk has been
widely studied and used in the financial industry.  VaR basically is a summary statistic
5  which can be divided into two classes: unconditional (time-independent) and conditional distributions
(time-dependent). The conditional distribution of growth rates includes models such as the GARCH and
Stochastic Volatility models.
6 This assumption is reasonable since growth rates are highly unstable over time, with a correlation across
decades of 0.1 to 0.3 (Easterly, 1996).
7 Normal distribution has skewness of 0 and a kurtosis of 3. The table for simple testing for normality is
upon request.
9that  quantifies  the exposure  of an asset  or portfolio  to risk  including  market  risk,  credit
risk  and  operational  risk.  Essentially  VaR  estimates  attempt  to  capture  extreme  events
that  occur  in  the  lower  tail  of  the  portfolio's  loss  distribution.  "Value  at  Risk  (VaR)
summarizes the expected maximum loss (or worst loss) over a target horizon within a
given confidence interval"  (Jorion, 1997, p.l9).  A distinct advantage of VaR is that it
summarizes  the largest possible  loss, or the total exposure  to risk of a financial  institution
in a single number, and easy to understand.
In  the  financial  industry,  a  major  purpose  of  using  VaR  is to  estimate  the  amount  of
capital  needed  to  support  a  bank's  risk  taking  activities,  which  is  typically  called
"economic  capital"  in  the  banking  industry.  While  intemal  systems  for  allocating
economic  capital  typically  encompass  all forms of risk facing  a bank  (credit, market,  and
operating  risks).  We give  an example  of the VaR for credit  risk resulting  from the default
events and also discuss  the allocation  of economic  capital  for credit  risk.
Systems  for  allocating  economic  capital  against credit  risk are based  on a bank's  estimate
of the probability  density  function  for credit  losses  (PDF).  Banks  could use its credit  risk
modeling  system  to estimate  such a PDF as shown in Exhibit  1. An important  property  of
the PDF is that the probability  of losses exceeding  a given amount  X (along the x-axis)  is
equal  to the shaded  area under  the PDF to the right of X. A single PDF  and a system PDF
are expected  to have a long and fat tail. The expected  operational  loss (shown as the left-
most  vertical  line) shows  that  the  amount  of operational  loss the  bank  would  expect  to
experience  on  its business  portfolio  over  the chosen  time  horizon.  The banking  industry
typically  focuses  on the credit risk of the portfolio  with  a measure  of unexpected  loss (i.e.
the  arnount  by  which  actual  losses  exceed  the  expected  loss).  Giveni the  shaded  area
(confidence  level)  and a chosen  timie horizon,  X is in fact the VaR relative  to zero,  or the
absolute  VaR.
VaR  /  \ 
Allocated  Economic  Capital
0  Expected  Losses  X  Operational  loss
Exhibit  1:  The Conceptual  Frarnework  of  VaR
10Using information on VaR, financial institutions allocate economic capital against credit
or market risks and prevent insolvency. For instance, the level of economic capital may
be set to achieve a 0.03 percent chance that unexpected credit losses would exceed this
level,  thereby causing insolvency.  The target  insolvency rate  will be  achieved with
99.97% confidence. Financial institutions usually use loan loss reserves to cover expected
credit losses, while it is the role of equity capital to  cover credit risk. In Exhibit  1,
therefore, the area under the PDF to the left of expected losses should be covered by the
loan loss reserve, while the bank's required economic capital is the amount of equity over
and above expected losses necessary to achieve the target insolvency rate. Under this risk
management  framework,  a  bank  would  consider itself  to  be  undercapitalized  if  its
required economic capital exceeded its actual tangible shareholder equity, adjusted for
any estimated surplus in the bank's reported loan loss reserve.
The estimation procedure for credit risk VaR is as follows:
*  Determine the time horizon over which we want to estimate a potential default loss.
The time horizon in the banking industry arises from one year to five years.
- Determine the window length which is the length of the subsample (the observation
period) used for VAR estimation. The window length choice is related to sampling
issues and availability of databases.
*  Select confidence level required for the estimation. With  the expectation that the
largest likely loss we will suffer 95 out of 100 times (95% confidence level) may not
suffice for credit risk.  The  financial industry may need  at  about 99%  or  99.5%
confidence level.
*  Work out a Probability Density Function (PDF) of likely losses for a risk componenlt
or system risk under consideration.8
*  Estimate the VaR.
*  Allocated economic capital for credit risk = VaR-Expected default losses.
Growth at Risk
Similar to VaR in the financial industry, growth at risk (GaR) proposed by this paper
summarizes the expected maximum economic downturn over a target horizon within a
given confidence interval. In theory, GaR can be derived from the probability distribution
of the future growth rates f(g). At a given confidence level c, we wish to find the worst
possible realization of growth rate, G*, such that the probability of exceeding this value is
c:
c = i  f  (g)dg  (1)
8 However, the major challenge in implementing VaR analysis is the specification of the probability
distribution of extreme default loss used. By contrast, market risk models take the normal distribution
frequently as a standard or benchmark, but this assumption has been challenged.
11or such that the probability of a value lower than G*, p=P(g<G*), is 1-c:
1 - c  =  fg,  f  (g  )dg  =  P (g  S  G *)  =  p  (2)
The cut off point G* is called the sample quantile of the distribution. This is the worst
possible growth rate  given the confidence of  1-c. This  specification is  valid for any
distribution of growth, fat or thin tailed. Thus, we define Growth at Risk or GaR as
GaR = E(G)  - G*  (3)
where E(G) is expected value of growth rates over a given window length (10 or 20
years),  G*  is  the  worst possible  growth rate  in  the  given  window length with  the
confidence of 1-c. 9
Using growth at risk, GaR as defined in equation (3), it is possible to analyze the possible
severity of dowrnurns over time. GaR is a sensible measure of severity that takes into
account the possible  size of the decline from the  expected growth rate  at the given
confidence level.  This measure shows the percentage-point of output that would be lost
in a possible recession. For example, if an economy's annual average growth rate over
the certain period is 4 percent and the time horizon for GaR is one year. As such, a GaP.
of 10 percent implies that the economy faces a recession in which possible output loss is
up to 10 percentage point below the mear of growth rates (4 percent) within one year at a
given confidence level.
Growth at risk is defined using informationi  from a growth distribution (PDF), different
from the definition of business cycles.  By contrast, the definition of business cycles
distinguishes two different types: the "classical" cycle, which refers to peaks and troughs
in the absolute levels of  per capita GDP series, and the "growth" cycle, which refers to
peaks  and troughs in  the  levels of the  detrended  series. 10 We  also divide economic
downturns into two categories: big recession and small recession. Similar to the recessioni
definition in  the  "growth  cycle,"  our  GaR  for  big  and  small  recessions  does  not
necessarily mean a negative growth rate. More specifically, the definitions are as follows:
Definition of GaR for big recession: a possible worst economic downturn which only
happens once over a  twenty-year period. This requires that the confidence level of GaR
is set at 5%, i.e. 1-c=5%, and corresponding quantile is G5* . As such, Growth at risk,
GaR5=E(G) - G5*, where E(G) is the expected value of growth rates over the window
length, 20 years.
Definition of GaR for small  recession: a  possible worst economic downtumn  which
happens once  every five-year period. This requires that the confidence level of VaR is
set at 20%, i.e. 1-c=20%, and thus corresponding quantile is G20*.  That is, Growth at
9 This  is the definition  of GaR relative  to the mean. There  is another  definition  for GaR  at zero.
10  In the press,  it is claimed  that three  consecutive  quarters  of negative  growth  as a recession.
12risk  is,  GaR20=E(G)-G20*, where E(G) is the expected value of growth rates over the
window length, 20 years."
There are two underlying assumptions of growth at risk, GaR: (1) growth rates of one
country are serially independent. This assumption implies that the growth rate in one year
will not affect growth rate in any other year, which  is quite reasonable. In particular,
Senhadji  (2000)  finds  that  growth  rate  has  only  a  weak  positive  autocorrelation
coefficient. (2) the population distribution of growth rate is stable through time.  Growth-
at-risk calculation is based solely on the recent history of the growth, by construction. In
other words, growth VaR assumes that the population distribution does not change over
the window length. As such, it relies on an assumption that the future will be like the past
and thus suffers a risk of structural breaks as discussed below.
It  is  important to  note  that  growth-at-risk as  a  forecast  measurement  of  economic
downturns has the potential bias resulting from  structural breaks.12 In the presence of
trend breaks, there is a trade-off between forecast bias and  standard error of GaR. The
common practice in estimating VaR is to use a rolling window of data, which has its own
shortcomings. A short window length may work well immediately after a break but will
lose valuable information in the distant past. On the other hand, a long window length
will delay the detection of a break and produce biased forecasts in the interim. Ideally,
the window  size should be  large far  away  from  the. most recent  break to  allow for
efficienit  estimation of GaR. The window length should.be shorter, the closer to the most
recent break, to avoid using too many data points prior,to the occurrence of "he break
which will bias the estimates of GaR.
4. A Panel Dataset on Growth at Risk, GaR, 1980-1998
The original data used here is the annual growth rates of per capita GDP for 84 countries
from  1961 to  1998 from  the World Bank  database.  Conventionally, there  are two
methods of estimating VaR in the financial industry, one based on a general historical
distribution, and one based on the assumption of a normal distribution.  The computation
can be simplified if the distribution can be assumed normal.  Here we use an empirical
distribution, since the distribution of growth rates is non-normal, as shown above.  This
means that we base our estimation of GaR on each country's  historical distribution of
annual growth rates by the following steps:
1. Choose time horizon. Because we only have annual growth rate, time horizon is one
year.
"' Due to the limited sample size, there is an estimation error  in GaR. the simplest method to verify the
accuracy of the GaR is to record the failure rate, which gives the proportion of times GaR is exceeded in
the given sample. Kendall (1994) and Kupiec (1995) discussed this error and developed some tests.
12 Ben-David and Papell (1995) use up to 130 years of annual aggregate and per capita GDP data for 16
countries to investigate whether output exhibits a trend break and whether economic growth is constant or
changing over time. Their study provides empirical evidence that, for nearly every one of the countries, the
years that provide the strongest evidence for a trend break are  associated with a sharp decline in GDP.
These breaks are associated with World War II for most of the countries and either World War I or the
Great Depression for the remainder.
132. Select window length. We choose 20 years as the length of the rolling window. This
means that we estimate GaR for  1980 by using the data from  1961-1980 and GaR for
1990 by using the data from 1971-1990. 1
3. Choose empirical distribution (Histogram) as the probability distribution of growth
rates.
The cumulative distribution function is
F  (X)  =  F  (X)  +  P(  X  xi  )
i+1 I- 
Where
max  - min
.xI  Z  -i  -+  nun,  x i.  <  x  <  x i+,l
n
and max- mn
Because the low frequency of anntual  data, however, the cumulative distributicn function
of the enmpirical  disiribution is based on a small number of observations for each country
and thus suffers from the large standard error in estimating the shape of the tail. For the
sake  of  simplicity,  we  have  not  used  a  kemel  density  estimator.  Nonetheless,  the
empirical distribution is able to give a reasonably effective way to capture the left-hand-
side  output  clownturns without  assuming  and  estimating  a  distribution.  Also,  the
empirical distribution can be robust once monthly or quarterly growth data is available.
4. Estimate the G* at the given confidence level, and
5. Calculate GaR5 (big recession) and GaR20 (small recession) as defined in the previous
section.
Using a twenty-year rolling window, we estimated GaR for 84 countries from 1980 to
1998. The time series of GaR examines the continuity and change in economic downside
fluctuations over time.  For example, GaR in 1990 is obtained by estimation the growth
performance from 1971 to 1990.
13  In choosing  an appropriate  window  length,  two  trade-offs  should  be considered.  First,  there is a trade-off
between  the time  span  of  the  data  and  the  standard  error  of  estimated  VaR.  For  example,  extreme
percentiles  such as the 5th  are very  difficult  to estimate  accurately  with  small  samples.  Given  the time  span
of the annual growth rate data is only about 40 years from 1961 to 1998, we attempt to estimate GaR for
big recession at the 5th percentile by  using 20-year long  observation periods  and  thus obtaining small
standard errors. Second, there is a trade-off between the standard error of estimated VaR and the risk of
structural breaks. The structure of the economies may change over time. As  such, emphasis on recent
growth information can be helpful in tracking the changes in growth downside risk.
14First let us examine the results for the United States"  In his 1959 Presidential Address to
the American Economic Association, Arthur Burns (1960, p. 1) predicted, if not the end
of business cycles in the United States, at least "progress towards economic stability."
The advent of stabilization policy, the end of bank runs, and structural changes in the
economy all seemed destined to radically reduce short-run economic fluctuations in the
postwar era. In Burns's (p. 17) words, "[T]he business cycle is unlikely to be as disturbing
or troublesome to our children as it once was to our fathers."
Using our GaR as the new measure for downside growth risk, we now analyze to what
extent Burns's prediction of growing stability stands.  Figure 5 shows that GaR for big
recession remains at the same level during the period 1980-1998. This implies that large
downside fluctuations have not  changed in some ways over time  and have remained
fundamentally similar over time. What has changed between the 1980s and 1990s is the
decline of the average severity of small recessions. Figure 5 shows the decline of GaR for
small recession in the  1990s. Based on the GaR indicators, it appears that the risk of
small  recession of the U.S.  economy has  declined in  the  1990s. One  caveat to this
conclusion is the possibility that a trend toward much greater stability may be becoming
apparent in the last 10 to 15 years.
[Refer to Figure 5 1
Now  we review  the pattern of GaR for  some regional  groups. The  84 countries are
divided into six regional groups. They are OECD, South America, Sub-Saharan Africa,
Middle East and North Africa, East Asia and South Asia. The Appendix gives the 'ist of
countries in each group.  Figure 6 and Figure 7 draw each regional group's time pattern
of GaR for big recession and small recession over the period 1980-1998.
On average, different regional groups experience very distinct GaR patterns over tirne.
Non-OECD  countries  experience  a  higher  downturn  risk,  while  OECD  countiies'
downturn risks for both big  and  small recessions  are the  lowest among the regional
groups. One may expect that East Asia's  growth miracle in the 1980s and early 1990s
may lead to low growth risks (low GaR) because the shocks that are required to put an
economy into recession are large.  Surprisingly, East Asia countries, which had been
growing faster, have had a high GaR for a big downturn at around 6 percent, much higher
than those for OECD countries.  Whereas its GaR for small recession has been declining
over the period  1980-1998, and to  a  level  close to  OECD countries. The high  GaR
estimate of East Asia for big recession may be considered an early warning indicator for
the severe economic downturn caused by the financial crisis in 1997.
Latin American and Sub-Saharan African countries have maintained high GaR value for
both big recessions and small recessions through the period 1980-1998. During the 1990s
per-capita income in Latin America grew at an annual average rate of around 2 percent,
after  having  fallen  at  an  annual  rate  of  almost  1  percent  during  the  1980s.  Its
performance in the 1990s remained below the pace of economic expansion to which the
region was accustomed prior to the debt crisis. But a declining GaR for big recessions in
the 1990s does give hope that the continent might be leaving the "lost decade" firmly
behind. Nonetheless, the region remains gripped with a disconcerting level of economic
downturn risk.
15In  addition,  as Latin  America  entered the  1990s it  found itself in  a  world of  high
macroeconomic volatility, driven in large part by highly volatile capital flows--or at least
magnified by them. The high level of international financial integration in the region has
put heavy pressure on macroeconomic policies and policymakers. Key instruments used
in the past such as pegged exchange rate and interest rate have either been abolished or
become ineffective.  New macroeconomic policies such as inflation-targeting and other
risk management instruments must be experimented and implemented. These challenges
to  policymakers may have exacerbated the volatility of economic outcomes both over
time and across households.
[Refer to Figure 6 and 7 ]
Basically, GaR serves as a practical summary measure for predicting the risk for, and
severity of, big  and  small recessions  given one-year time horizon, based  on the past
distribution of growth within 20 years.
5. Downside Growth Risk and Long Term Growth
In this section we examine the relationship between downside growth risk and long-term
ggowth using data on over  84 countries from  1980 to  1998 in  the tradition of .cross-
country anialysis.  Following Ramey and Ramney  1995. we begin with simple correlation
and lollowed by cross-country regressions with several controlling variables.  We first
calculate  the correlation between  the  average annual growth  rate and  GaRS for  big
recessions and GaR20 for small recessions, respectively. The result for big recession risk
is
gi = 3.472  - 0.269GaR5i
(3.762)  (-2.513)
(R2 =0.061, t statistics in parentheses), and the result for small recession risk is
gi = 2.215  - 0.228GaR20O
(4.241)  (-2.110)
(R  =0.052, t statistics in parentheses). As the regressions show, there is a negative and
statistically significant association between long-term growth and downside growth risk.
In light  of previous cross-country empirical studies of  growth especially Levine  and
Renelt (1992), we now examine the relationship between long-term growth and GaR in
models that control for other important variables. The purpose is to test whether this
negative relationship is still robust. The econometric specification is given by
gi = a  +  bXi +  cGaRi  + e,
16where gi is the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP, Xi  is a vector of control
variables, GaRi  is a vector of growth downside variables,  b and c is the coefficient
vector, £j is the residual.  Levine and Renelt's  (1992) basic information set consists of
the following variables: the average investment share of GDP, initial log GDP per capita,
the average growth rate of the population, trade/GDP ratio. We use this dataset as the
basis and add two variables we constructed: GaR5 and GaR20.
Table  I  presents estimation results of the above models. The regression in Column  1
shows that the coefficient of GaR5 for big recession is negative and significant at  10
percent  confidence.  Similarly, Column 2's  regression shows  that  the coefficient  of
GaR20, for small recessions is negative and significant. These imply that there is indeed a
negative association between downside growth risks and long-term growth rates.  The
transmission channel might be through investment.  When a country's perceived level of
downside growth risk is relatively high, investors might be cautious in making long-term
investment in  the  country.  Foreign  investors  in  particular  might be  deterred from
investing in this country and instead they may invest somewhere else.  Thus, long-term
growth would suffer.  Furthermore, even human capital investment might be affected as
the rate of return from investing in education is low and uncertain.  This association is
quite  plausible  in  countries  that  have  had  poor  growth  performance  and  political
instability in the past, such as some Sub-Saharan African countries.
Coluinn 3 includes both GaR5 and GaR20 and shows that the coefficients for both:  GaR5
and GaR20 are not significantly different from zero. This. should not be a surprise since
there is significant niulti-collinearity between two risk measures. In particular, the two
downside growth risk indicators are highly correlated with each other; with the Pearson
correlation coefficient of 0.699 for contemporaneous correlations over  1980-1998. And
by definition, GaR20 for small recessions includes all the events that were included in
GaR5 for big recessions.  The multi-colinearity problem in  this particular regression
would tend to lead to insignificant coefficients. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that
the coefficient for GaR5 is still a bigger negative number than that for GaR20.  This
implies that the negative effect of growth at risk for big recessions is more important,
once a more complete panel data analysis has been conducted.
Also, three regressions produce the same results as Levine and Renelt (1992) for the
basic variables: (1) investment rate has robust and positive effects on growth (2) the
coefficients of initial per capital GDP are negative and significant; (3) the coefficients of
population growth are negative and robust; (4) the coefficients of trade/GDP ratio are
positive but not significant.
17Table  1. Relationship  between  the Downside  Growth  Risk and Long-term  Growth
(Conditional on Levine-Renelt Variables) for the 84-country Sample 1980-1998
De  endent variable: Average annual GDP per capita, 1980-98
Independent  variable  Column  1  Column  2  Column  3
Constant  -8.590**  -9.228*  -8.535**
(4.301)  (1.914)  (4.265)
Investment  share  of GDP  0.655**  0.649**  0.658**
(7.686)  (7.610)  (7.703)
Population  Growth  -0.334**  -0.375**  -0.334**
(-2.861)  (-3.358)  (-2.849)
Trade/GDP  ratio  0.052  0.064  0.063
(0.510)  (0.628)  (0.612)
l  _  _____________________________________________________
Initial  per capita  GDP  -0.272**  -0.290**  -0.298**
(-2.105)  (-2.184)  (-2.246)
GaR5  for Big Recessions  -0.194*  -0.137
(1-c=O.Q5)  __  (-1.970)  _  (-1.160)  _
GaR20  for Small  Recessions  -0.169*  -0.098
(1-c=0.20)  (-1.814)  (-0.884)
Adjusted  0.517  0.514  0.516
R Square  _
Number  of observations  84  84  84
Note: numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
** indicates significance at 5 Percent confidence;
*  indicates significance at 10 percent confidence.
186. Concluding  Remarks
Growth volatility is important due to its implications to welfare and long-term growth.
Perhaps even more important are the severe economic downturns that occur periodically
and have grave consequences to the poor.  In this paper we propose a perspective of
growth risk to understand economic fluctuations and a new measurement of the downside
growth risk GaR. This measure enables us to quantify the perceived level of downside
growth risk and severity, in a single number, thereby facilitate risk monitoring overtime
and comparison  across countries.  However, using  GaR as  a  predicting  tool is  not
advisable because of the risk of structural breaks.
This paper sheds light on quantifying downside growth risks by constructing a  panel
dataset on GaR. Using GaR in a cross-country analysis, we find that higher perceived
levels of downside growth risk seem to be negatively and strongly associated with long-
term growth.  When a country's perceived level of downside growth risk is relatively
high, both  domestic and foreign investors might be  deterred from  making  long terrn
investment in this particular country and instead they may invest somewhere else. There
might  be  a  vicious circle,  from  one  recession,  to  higher  perceived  risk  and  low
investment, (or domestic instability) and to another recession or long term stagnation.
The results seem to suggest what we already know, that prudent and consistent pursuit of
socio-economic and political stability would contribute to long-term growth, and that risk
management in  a  broader  sense should  be  a  vita]  part  of  pro-growth  and  poverty
reduction strategy.
Much remains to be done.  This is only the first stage of our analysis on growth at risk. In
the next stage we plan to conduct panel data analysis on the determinants of growth at
risk, and its relationship with long term growth.
19Appendix
Table Al  The List of Countries in Different Regional Groups
l.OECD Countries  2. South America  3. Sub-Saharan  4. Middle East  5. East Asia  6. South Asia
Africa  and  and China
North Africa
Australia  AUS  Argentina  ARG  Belice  BLZ  Algeria  DZA  Hong  HKG  Banglade BGD
Kong,  sh
China
Austria  AUT  Brazil  BRA  Benin  BEN  Egypt,  EGY  Indonesi  IDN  Nepal  NPL
Arab  a
Rep.
Belgium  BEL  Chile  CHL  Botswan  BWA  Israel  ISR  Malaysia MYS  Pakistan  PAK
a
Canada  CAN  Colombia  COL  Burkina  BFA  Malta  MLT  Philippin PHL  China  CHN
Faso  es
Denmark  DNK  Costa Rica  CRI  Burundi  BDI  Saudi  SAU  Singapor SGP
Arabia  e
Finland  FIN  Dominiican  DOM  Cameroo CMR  Taiwan,  '1WN
Republic  n  China
France  FRA  Ecuador  ECU  Central  CAF
African
Replublic
Greece  GRC  El Salvador  SLV  Congo,  ZAR
Dem.
Rep.
Iceland  ISL  Guatemala  GTM  Congo,  COG
Rep.
Ireland  1RL  Jamaica  JAM  Cote  CIV
d'lvoire
Italy  ITA  Mexico  MEX  Gabon  GAB
Japan  JPN  Panama  PAN  Ghana  GHA
Netherland  NLD  Paraguay  PRY  Kenya  KFN
s
New  NZL  Trinidad and  TTO  Lesotho  LSO
Zealand  Tobago
Norway  NOR  Uruguay  URY  Luxemb  JLUX
ourg
Portugal  PRT  Venezuela  VEN  Madagas MDG
car
Spain  ESP  Malawi  MWI
Sweden  SWE  Mauritania  MRT
Switzerlan  CBE  Mauritius  MUS
d
United  GBR  Niger  NER
Kingdom





Sierra Leone  SLE
20South Africa  ZAF
Sudan  SDN
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Growth At Risk for Small Recessions: Regional Groups 1980-1998
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Growth At Risk for Big Recessions:  Regional Groups,  1980-1998
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